In this study we propose an approach of quantifying the risks of misinforming and malfunctioning aiming to assess the quality of a warranty policy. We identify the "quality" of a warranty policy as an integral measure, based on the balance between two types of warranty -the warranty of malfunctioning and warranty of misinforming. This measure is represented in terms of the length of the warranty coverage, which is the main one-dimensional warranty parameter. A possible approach of identifying the "best" quality warranty policy is outlined.
Introduction
Product warranty is used by the manufacturers/vendors as a mechanism to share the risks associated with the uncertainty of the product performance with their customers. Nowadays warranty is one of the product attributes and it is used as a competing tool on the marketplace. Appropriately assigned product warranty could significantly stimulate the sale process and positively impact the producers' profit. At the same time, the warranty servicing cost should be taken into account, because if these are high enough, they could lead to considerable losses. In Christozov, Chukova, and Mateev (2009a) , two types of warranty were identified:
• Warranty of malfunctioning -it is related to product's failure to perform the functions as specified in its description for a predetermined (warranty) period of time ] , 0 [ R R t t = , which usually starts right after the sale. The length (size) of the warranty period is usually closely related to reliability and quality of the product. The risk of malfunctioning is shared between the producer and the customer through this warranty of malfunctioning. This type of warranty is widespread and serves many purposes, including protection for producer, seller and consumer. They are used as signals of quality and as elements of marketing strategies. A general treatment of warranty analysis is given by Murthy (1993, 1996) , Chukova, Dimitrov, and Rykov (1993) , Murthy and Djamaludin, (2002) , and Karim and Suzuki (2004) . From the buyers' point of view, the Material published as part of this publication, either on-line or in print, is copyrighted by the Informing Science Institute. Permission to make digital or paper copy of part or all of these works for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that the copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage AND that copies 1) bear this notice in full and 2) give the full citation on the first page. It is permissible to abstract these works so long as credit is given. To copy in all other cases or to republish or to post on a server or to redistribute to lists requires specific permission and payment of a fee. Contact Publisher@InformingScience.org to request redistribution permission.
main role of warranty is to provide protection. Specifically the warranty of malfunctioning assures the buyer that a faulty item will either be repaired or replaced at no cost or at a reduced cost. In addition, the warranty is a signal of quality, i.e., it has informational impact on the buyers.
• Warranty of misinforming -it is related to a failure in the communication process during the course of the product sale, which leads to customers being misinformed regarding the product's features and scope of usage. The warranty of misinforming shares the risk of misinforming for a period of time
, during which the customers are protected against misinforming, i.e., during this period they can return the product for full reimbursement. This type of warranty is well represented by the slogan "If you are not fully satisfied -money back guaranteed". The concept of information misbalance originates in Arrow (1963) , where he introduced it as a "moral hazard." His ideas were further developed by Akerlof (1970) , where he investigated the influence of asymmetric information on the market value of a commodity. The impact and usage of the information asymmetry to improve the influence in business relationship branched off from the studies initiated by Akerlof. Slovac (1993) and White and Eiser (2005) studied the asymmetric impact of negative and positive information on the social trust, known as principle of Information Asymmetry or Trust Asymmetry. They concluded that negative information reaches and influences decisions of wider set of potential clients than positive information. Hseih, Lai, and Shi (2006) consider the impact of information asymmetry on the success in business transactions, but they do not go beyond recommendations on how to improve the information process.
Quantifying the risks of malfunctioning of the products is relatively well studied (see Blischke & Murthy, 1993 , 1996 . It uses models, based on information obtained from reliability tests, quality control, or other activities carried out by the producer to study product's performance measures. The accuracy of this assessment is entirely under the control of the producer, and the assigned warranty policies fully reflect the objectives of the warrantor. On the other hand, measuring the risk of misinforming is related to failures in the communication processes. It is not under the control of either of the parties involved in the communication, and its evaluation requires different approaches and techniques for collecting and processing data. The primary data source for evaluating the risk of misinforming is the customer's feedback on their satisfaction with the performance and suitability of the product. Christozov, Chukova, and Mateev (2007 , 2009a , 2009b , 2009c ) developed a framework for quantifying the risk of misinforming, caused by information asymmetry. Here, by using the proposed measures, we outline a new approach on how to evaluate the "quality" of a given warranty policy.
The Mixed Warranty Policy
The two types of warranty, the warranty of malfunctioning and warranty of misinforming, have one main parameter of interest -the warranty period. During this period of time 1 , warranty claim against a faulty product is legitimate. Next, based on these two types of warranties, we define a new, so called, mixed warranty policy. 
This definition is an attempt to put together the ideas of warranty of malfunctioning and warranty of misinforming and propose a uniform mechanism for risk sharing for both types of uncertainties -uncertainties related to malfunctioning as well as uncertainties related to misinforming.
Quality of Warranty Policy
Next, we introduce the notion of quality of warranty policy from producers' as well as from client's viewpoints. Usually, the term "quality" is used to define the complete set of properties pertinent to a given object. From business point of view, quality represents a measure of excellence (see http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/quality.html). Here, we consider the quality of a mixed warranty policy and identify what represents a high quality warranty policy from producers' as well as from client's viewpoint. (optimal) quality, if it minimizes the expected warranty servicing cost and it maximizes the level of product acceptance by the clients.
These definitions address the two major roles of warranty from the seller's point of view -sharing with the customers the uncertainties of the product performance and promoting the product on the marketplace. Offering no warranty on malfunctioning will reduce the expected warranty cost to zero and will lead to a lower sale price, but at the same time will place the entire risk of malfunctioning or dissatisfaction on the customer. Maximizing the level of acceptance of the product by allowing warranty returns for unlimited time is also unjustified policy from producers' point of view because it could lead to substantial financial losses. A high-quality warranty policy provides a balance between these two extremes. The balance is based on the evaluation of the two risksthe risk of malfunctioning and the risk of misunderstanding. Definition 4. From client's point of view, the quality of a mixed warranty policy p W is identified by the "balanced" value of the "warranty parameter" that provides the best support for the client's correct purchase decision and the level of uncertainty it allows in supporting client's correct purchase decision.
Definition 5. From client's point of view, a mixed warranty policy p W is of high (optimal) quality if the "balanced" value of the "warranty parameter" is maximal and the level of uncertainty it allows in supporting client's correct purchase decision is minimal.
Next, using the models for quantifying the risk of misinforming (Christozov, Chukova, & Mateev, 2009 b) we develop a measure for the quality of a warranty policy from client's point of view. Also, we provide a discussion on the quality of a warranty policy from producers' point of view.
Quality Comparison between the Mixed and Pure
Warranties (Client's Viewpoint)
We assume that, when making a purchase decision, the client trades off between the following two warranty-related arguments:
• Is the product life cycle long enough? This question is linked to the reliability of the product. The warranty of malfunctioning provides a message related to this question -the longer the warranty of malfunctioning is, the longer the product will preserve its value to the user. (1) i.e., we assume that only these two parameters will influence the client's purchase decision. Another way of looking at (1) is to say that we have imposed a probability distribution on the two warranty parameters.
One possible way of quantifying the quality of a warranty policy
is by assessing how the warranty parameters R t and M t support the clients in making a correct purchase decision. In addition, we assume that an incorrect purchase decision is also unfavorable to the producer/seller, i.e., it increases the warranty servicing cost. This assumption is reasonable because, firstly, the client may not be "fully satisfied" and seek reimbursement and, secondly, s/he may use the product for solving tasks the product is not suitable for, which may result in misuse and within the warranty failure of the product. • the expected value
represents the "balanced" value of the "warranty parameter" that provides the best support for the client's correct purchase decision.
From client's point of view, the "balanced" value ( ) E w integrates fully the importance of the two warranty aspects -malfunctioning and misinforming. Moreover, increasing the value of the balanced warranty parameter increases the quality of the warranty policy.
• the standard deviation
represents the possible error (or deviation) from the best "balanced" value of the warranty parameter. We interpret this deviation as a measure of uncertainty allowed by the policy in supporting client's correct purchase decision. Decreasing the value of this uncertainty increases the quality of the warranty policy.
Therefore in comparing warranty policies, we assess their quality by comparing their balanced warranty parameters and the measures of uncertainty they allow in supporting a client's correct purchase decision. From the client's viewpoint, the warranty strategy with the largest balanced warranty parameter and the smallest measure of uncertainty is the one with the highest quality. Sometime, in order to identify the best quality warranty policy, a compromise between these two criteria is needed.
Let us compare the expectation of w for the three cases -the two pure warranty strategies and the mixed one. We obtain:
• For the pure warranty of malfunctioning, {1, 0} We use this simple example to provide an intuitive illustration for the motivation behind our definitions of quality of warranty policy. We observe that, depending on the length of the warranty periods related to malfunctioning and misinforming, both parameters -expectation and variation -must be considered to distinguish the quality of different policies.
Assessment of the Warranty Policy Parameters
The two parameters in a mixed warranty policy { , } Figure 1 represents the clients' learning curve during the warranty (trial) period (see Christozov, Chukova, & Mateev, 2009c) . The trial period starts with an initial level of certainty, p , on whether the product is suitable to solve his/her tasks and satisfy his/her needs. The assessment of p is subjectively made by the client at the time of making the purchase decision. During the trial period, the client's knowledge regarding the actual feature/capabilities of the product to solve his/her tasks and to satisfy his/her needs approaches the real, objective capability of the product, which is estimated to be equal to p . The learning time t is proportional to the level of information asymmetry ia , which is defined (see Christozov, Chukova, & Mateev, 2007) as
The larger the information asymmetry the longer learning time needed. If we assume that the shapes of the learning curves of different clients are similar in approaching p , the time to reach understanding regarding the suitability of the product depends on the value of the information asymmetry.
In the case of a wrong decision made by an optimist, i.e., p q p< < , learning means that the assessment regarding capability of the product decreases and crosses the level of acceptance q (as illustrated in Figure 1 ) at time c t . This shape of the learning curves represents our understanding that learning is a logarithmic function on time. For more on the definition/estimation of the level of acceptance q see Christozov, Chukova, and Mateev (2007) . At time c t , due to the dissatisfaction with the product performance, the client may decide to make a claim against the product. The trial period should be long enough to allow the client to make a claim at time c t . For this type of clients extending the trial period will support their purchase decision. In the case of a client who is an optimist but who made a correct decision, i.e., p p q< < , as well as for all other types of clients -pessimists and realists, extending the trial period will lead only to extra time of using the product potentially for free and the warranty servicing cost may be unnecessary increased. of the "quality" of a warranty policy from the producers' point of view. We illustrate the ideas using an example drawn from our previous empirical studies.
misinforming -the lower bound l r and upper bound u r are selected, so they represent suitably the range of this risk for the respondents.
The ratios of respondents falling in each of the above nine categories will allow us to assess the quality of the warranty policy with respect to each particular target group. The average adjusted risk for the group of 54 respondents was evaluated at 0.296. Within this group the minimum computed risk was 0.030 and the maximum computed risk was equal to 0.573. We consider the range Table 1 and presented the results in Table 2 . . Based on this information, using the approach sketched in the section on Assessment of the Warranty, the quality of the warranty strategies, from the client's point of view, could be evaluated.
The group of respondents is dominated by the sub-group of optimists -they are 38 out of 54 and the average risk of misinforming for this group is 0.337. This value is close to the upper bound of the medium level risk range. The other two sub-groups of respondents are the sub-group of pessimists (4 out of 54), with the average risk of misinforming 0.311, and the sub-group of realists (12 out of 54), with the average risk of misinforming 0.159. The average value of information asymmetry for the whole group is 0.19, with information asymmetry computed only for the subgroup of optimists equal to 0.24.
To assess the quality of the three warranty policies, from a producer point of view, we will apply the following criteria:
1. Assess whether the policy supports the client's purchase decision making process. Looking at the above data, we may consider that the pure strategy 2. Assess the effect of the offered warranty on the reputation of the seller. The cost of misinforming on the reputation of the seller/producer with the first pure warranty strategy is defined as the proportion of unsatisfied clients who cannot claim full reimbursement on their product. For the above data, only 20% of clients will be "fully satisfied" (low risk), 56% will experience medium dissatisfaction, and 23% will be extremely disappointed by their purchase. Therefore, nearly 80% of the customers will experience significant dissatisfaction, which may have a considerable negative impact on the reputation of the seller. Thus, the pure strategy (36, 0) p W cannot be considered as a high quality warranty policy.
Based on the above discussion, we conclude that the data obtained in our empirical study supports our intuition that the mixed warranty policy is of higher quality, from the producer's point of view, than the two pure warranty policies.
Conclusion
In this study we propose an initial model for identifying the notion of "quality of a warranty policy." We introduce the notion of mixed warranty policy to combine the effect of warranty of malfunctioning and warranty of misinforming. In addition, we identify the quality of a warranty policy from two different viewpoints: client's viewpoint as well as producer's point of view. We propose an initial approach of quantifying the quality of warranty policy from the client's viewpoint. Using our previous results and empirical survey data, we present a discussion on the quality of several warranty options. The expectation that the mixed warranty strategy outperforms any of the pure warranty strategies motivated this study. It is more at conceptual level attempting to identify the concept of "quality" of a warranty policy and to define approaches and criteria to measure and compare different policies. At the same time, during the course of this study, we have identified a list of open problems that need further research. For example, an open problem that deserves a close attention is how to identify the "best" mixed warranty strategy mathematically: should this identification be formulated as an optimization problem; should some constraints be imposed on the warranty parameters; should the parameters of a mixed warranty strategy be considered as independent or should some dependence be introduced; etc. In this study we used data collected earlier, i.e., for different purposes, to illustrate our new ideas. Our next task will be to design an experiment for collecting appropriate empirical data, which allow a better illustration and application of our new models related to the quality of warranty policy. Informa" (1986 Informa" ( -1993 . Dr. Christozov was involved in establishing the national information network for technology transfer and research in the areas of technologies assessment, integral quality measures and information systems for quality management. In these areas he was recognized as one of the leading experts in Bulgaria. Professor Christozov has more than 70 publications as separate volume, journal papers, and papers in refereed proceedings. He is a founding member of Informing Science Institute and chair of Bulgarian Informing Science Society; and member of the Bulgarian Statistical Society.
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